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Chapter 3 The Teleological Theory of Representation
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter and the next I shall be considering two topics which are widely 
regarded as raising difficulties for physicalism.  This chapter will be concerned with 
mental representation. The next chapter will deal with consciousness. It is not difficult 
to see why mental representation is often thought to present a problem for physicalism. 
Mental states like beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and the other propositional attitudes 
have representational contents:  they represent the world as being a certain way.  But 
how can this be, if such mental states involve nothing more than physical states of the 
brain?  If my belief that Lima is the capital of Peru is realized by an arrangement of 
neurones, then how does this belief manage to reach out across the world and latch on 
to a city I have never seen?  How can a bank of neurones be about something outside 
my head?1
 Different ph ysicalist theories of mind, such as functionalism, or Davidsonian 
anomalous monism, or any of the many other physicalist accounts of mind currently 
on offer, will make this problem precise in rather different ways.  However, since my 
aim in this chap ter is to defend a positive solution -- the teleological theory of 
representation -- which will be available to physicalists of all kinds, it will not matter 
greatly exactly which version of physicalism we start with.  So I shall follow the 
pattern o f much recent literature, and start once more with functionalism. 
 The overall plan of this chapter will be as follows.  In the next section (3.2) I shall 
show how repesentation arises as a problem for functionalism, and offer the tel 
eological theory of representation as an initial solution.  Then, after some brief 
comments about broad propositional attitudes (3.3), I shall elaborate some of the 
details of the teleological theory, in the course of answering the standard objection 
that some beliefs serve biological purposes even when they are false (3.4).  This will 
prompt some discussion of the status of belief-desire psychology (3.5), and also show 
how the teleological theory incorporates, rather than competes with, the ide a that 
truth guarantees the satisfaction of desires (3.6).  Sections 3.7-10 will then defend this 
satisfaction-guaranteeing component in the teleological theory against a number of 
objections, and will also consider some alternative theories which sh are this 
satisfaction-guaranteeing assumption, but do not incorporate it within a teleological 
context.  After this I shall return to the issue of broad beliefs, showing how it is 
unsurprising, given the teleological theory, that beliefs and desiress hould fail to 
supervene on brain states (3.11-12).  The final two sections of the chapter will then 
discuss the availability of empirical evidence for the teleological theory (3.13), and 
point out the radically anti-verificationist implications of th e theory (3.14). 
3.2  Functionalism and Representation
Functionalism views beliefs and desires and other mental states as internal causal 
intermediaries between perception and behaviour.  For functionalism, w e might say, 
beliefs and desires are part of a system of internal pushes and pulls which explains 
why people behave as they do.  This functionalist picture of mental states raises 
immediate questions about representation.  After all, why should components in an 
internal causal structure be credited with representational powers?  Surely an internal 
causal role is one thing, and a representational relationship to an (almost invariably) 
extra-cranial state of affairs another.  Functionali sm seems to describe only the first, 
causal aspect of mental states, and to omit the second, representational aspect.  As it is 
sometimes put, functionalism seems to give us only the "syntax" of mental states, and 
to leave out their "semantics". 
 It is true that most versions of functionalism follow everyday practice and identify 
beliefs and desires in terms of "content clauses", as the belief that p, the desire that q, 
and so on.  However, from the perspective of the rest of the functionalist package, this 
need only be viewed as the most convenient among many possible ways of indicating 
the causal structure of beliefs and desires, as one way of "labelling" causal roles, and 
not as an essential use of representational notions.&nb sp; After all, how could 
representational relationshipships to often distant states of affairs be intrinsic to the 
internal causal roles of mental states? 
 It is perhaps worth pausing on this point.  Despite what I have just said, doe sn't the 
functionalist approach to the mind need to invoke assumptions about what desires are 
for and beliefs are about, in order to infer what agents will do?  Well, functionalism 
does indeed attend to the causal roles of mental states;  and, a s I have just said, it 
does take these causal roles to be indexed by content clauses.  But, to repeat, it is not 
essential to this that the content clauses specify what beliefs are about or desires are 
for.  A nice way to bring this out is to th ink of contents, as some philosophers do, in 
terms of sets of possible worlds.  On this account, the content of an instrumental 
belief that F will cause G is the set of worlds in which F does cause G, and the content 
of a desire for G is the set of w orlds in which G obtains.  Given this, and given that 
agents tend to perform those actions that they believe are necessary for what they 
want, functionalism could then invoke, as a first aproximation, the generalization that 
an agent will do F just i n case the set of worlds which comprises the content of the 
agent's desires is contained in the set of worlds which comprises the content of the 
agent's instrumental beliefs about F.  Note, however, that it does not matter to this 
generalization that these beliefs and desires represent the world as being a certain way 
-- that they are true (in the case of beliefs) or satisfied (desires) just in case the actual 
world is a member of the set of worlds which constitutes the content.  All the general 
ization needs are the overall sets of worlds which comprise the contents, since these 
alone suffice to specify the interdependent causal roles of beliefs and desires;  it is 
irrelevant that these contents also determine, together with the actual worl d, whether
beliefs are true or desires satisfied.  Which is why, from the functionalist point of 
view, any other similar structures could in principle serve to specify causal roles 
instead, even if they didn't involve the entities we normally think o f beliefs and 
desires as about -- provided, that is, that they at least succeed in tying mental states to 
the bits of behaviour, the Fs, which are the end points of the causal roles the 
functionalist is interested in. 
 So the complaint is that functionalism gives only internal causal roles, and not 
representation.  It might seem to some readers, however, that the difficulty is easily 
remedied.  Isn't the trouble just that functionalism thinks of the "inputs" and "outputs" 
of caus al roles too narrowly, with inputs starting with the sense organs, and outputs 
finishing with bodily movements?  So why not simply extend our causal net to allow 
more distal causes of perception, on the input side, and more distal effects of behaviou 
r, on the output side?  This would allow us to analyse the truth conditions of beliefs 
as those distal circumstances which cause them, and the satisfaction conditions of 
desires as those distal states of affairs they give rise to, and would the reby seem to 
reintroduce aboutness without further ado. 
 This move, however, is fatally afflicted by the disease known as 
"disjunctivitis".2  The belief that there is an ice-cream in front of you can be caused, 
not on ly by a real ice-cream, but also by a plastic ice-cream, or a hologram of an ice-
cream, or so on.  So, on the current suggestion, the belief in question ought to 
represent either-a-real-ice-cream-or-a-plastic-one-or-any-of-the-other-things-that-
might -fool-you.  Which of course it doesn't. 
 Similarly with desires.  The results which follow any given desire include not only 
the real object of the desire, but also various unintended consequences.  So the current 
suggestion would imply that the object of any desire is the disjunction of its real 
object with all those unintended consequences. Which of course it isn't. 
 So, even if we widen functionalism's causal roles to include distal causes and effect 
s, we still need somehow to winnow out, from the various causes that give rise to 
beliefs, and the various results that eventuate from desires, those which the beliefs are 
about, and which the desires are for. 
 This is where an appeal to teleological considerations seems to yield a natural and 
satisfying answer.  We can pick out a desire's real satisfaction condition as that effect 
which it is the desire's biological purpose to produce.  And, similarly, we can pick out 
the real truth condition of a belief as that condition which it is the biological purpose 
of the belief to be co-present with.3
 This teleological theory of representation will be elaborated and defended in detail 
in what follo ws.  But at this stage let me make two immediate points.  First, my use 
of "purpose" and similar phrases should be understood, as in chapter 2, in terms of the 
aetiological account of teleological notions.  That is, I take it that the purpo se of A is 
to do B just in case A is now present because in the past some selection process 
selected items that do B.  So, in the specific context at hand, when I speak of that 
condition which it a desire's biological purpose to produce, I take it th at some past 
selection mechanism has favoured that desire --  or, more precisely, the ability to 
form that type of desire --  in virtue of that desire producing that effect.  And when I 
speak of the condition which it is the bio logical purpose of a belief to be co-present 
with, I take it that some past selection mechanism has selected that belief --  or, more 
precisely, the ability to form that belief type --  in virtue of its occurring in 
conjunction with that condition.  (As in chapter 2, those readers who dislike the 
aetiological analysis of purposive talk can simply replace all my references to 
purposes by references to selection mechanisms.  What matters to my story is that 
mental states shou ld be the products of selection processes, not what terminology we 
use to specify this.) 
 The second immediate point I wish to make is that this selectionist-teleological 
approach to mental representation does not imply that all representa tional abilities 
must be genetically innate products of inter-generational selection.  For selection-
based teleology can also be a product of individual learning (cf. "The pigeon is 
pressing the bar in order to get food").  And so, if some non-i nnate belief or desire is 
selected in the course of individual learning in virtue of the condition it is co-present 
with, or the result it gives rise to, then that belief or desire will have a genuine 
selection-based representational purpose, despite its non-innateness. 
3.3  Broad Contents
It will be helpful, before proceding to further details of the teleological theory, to 
comment briefly on the relation between my argument so far and the recent debate 
about "br oad" versus "narrow contents".  My reference, in the middle of the last 
section, to the possibility of "widening" the functionalist net, may have made some 
readers think of recent philosophical discussions of "broad contents".  However, our 
curr ent concerns are rather more general than the debate about broad contents.  Our 
present topic is to understand content as such:  why do mental states, of whatever kind, 
have contents?  The debate about broad contents, by contrast, takes the existence of 
contents as such for granted, and is concerned with more detailed questions about 
which specific mental states have which specific contents. 
 The debate about broad contents arises from the observation, to which I drew attent 
ion in chapter 1, that the content of many beliefs seems to depend, not just on the 
believer's physical make-up, but also on features of the context.  Thus Hilary Putnam 
has argued that the identity of beliefs about natural kinds depends on what kind s are 
actually present in the believer's world (1975);  Tyler Burge has argued that the 
contents of theoretical beliefs can depend on features of the social context (1979, 
1982);  and Gareth Evans has maintained that the possession of singular b eliefs 
demands the existence of the objects those beliefs are about (1982). 
 These philosophers and their followers form one side of the debate about broad 
contents.  On the other side is a sizeable minority who are suspicious of broa d beliefs, 
on the grounds, roughly, that it is hard to see how differences which lie outside the 
head can matter to the explanatory significance of mental states (cf Fodor, 1987). 
 This is why I said the debate about broad contents is less general than our current 
concerns.  The participants in the debate take it as given that our beliefs and other 
attitudes have representational contents.  The point of dispute is only whether or not 
these contents are fixed by internal physical make-up. 
 John McDowell (1986, sect 5) has suggested that it is only possible to get worried 
about the general possibility of representation if you make the mistake of thinking that 
all beliefs are narrow.  McDowell's thought is that a problem about representation 
only arises as long as we think of beliefs as things inside people's head.  Once we 
recognize that the very possession of a belief can involve extra-cranial facts, we ought 
no longer to be puzzled about how things insid e the head can stand for things outside. 
 This seems to me to get things exactly the wrong way round.  Merely accepting that 
the possession of beliefs involves entities outside believers' heads does little to explain 
how representatio n as such is possible.  After all, plenty of the other states that people 
possess involve entities outside their heads --  for example, financial solvency, or 
popularity, or being married --  without thereby becoming representat ional. 
 Far from appealing to broad contents to dissolve the general problem of 
representation, I think we will do better to solve the general problem of representation 
first, and then apply the solution to the issue of broad contents.&nbs p; In the absence 
of any general understanding of representation as such, much of the current debate 
between the friends and enemies of broad contents has collapsed into an indecisive 
trading of intuitions.  However, once we have arrived at a satisfa ctory general theory 
of content, then we shall understand why it is quite unsurprising that some contents 
should be broad.  I shall return to this issue in section 3.10 below. 
3.4  Functional Falsity
A good w ay to develop the details of the teleological theory is to consider a familiar 
objection.  This is the objection that certain beliefs have biological purposes which 
require them to be present when they are false, and so constitute prima facie counter -
examples to the teleological thesis that truth conditions can be analysed as those 
circumstances in which beliefs are biologically supposed to be present.  (Ned Block 
has urged this objection on me.  See also Stich, 1982, p 53.) 
 ; For example, consider the belief that you are not going to be injured in some 
unavoidable and imminent trial of violence.  It is arguable that natural selection has 
bequeathed us an innate disposition to form this belief, even in cases where it hig hly 
likely that we will in fact be injured, in order to ensure that we will not flinch in 
battle.  But it then seems to follow that, according to the teleological theory, the truth 
condition of this belief will include many cases where we will be inj ured --  since 
such cases will be among those where we are biologically supposed to have the 
belief.  So we seem to have a reductio of the teleological theory.  For by hypothesis 
the truth condition of the belief is that we won't be i njured. 
 Examples like this are interesting, but I don't think they suffice to discredit the 
teleological theory.  In order to see why not, we need to consider the way that beliefs 
and desires combine to generate actions in the overal l human decision-making 
system.  It will emerge that the purpose of beliefs in this system is to guide actions in 
such a way that desires will be satisfied.  And then, by understanding the teleological 
theory as focusing on this specific purpose of beliefs, we will be able to accommodate 
examples of the above kind.  The point will be that stopping you flinching is a special
kind of biological purpose, which cuts across the purpose of satisfying desires,4  and 
which therefore does not require the truth of beliefs in the way that the satisfaction of 
desires does. 
 The overall biological function of the human decision-making system is to generate 
actions that cause biologically suitable results.  Beliefs an d desires both contribute to 
this purpose.  However, they contribute in different ways.  The role of desires is to do 
with the fact that different results are suitable at different times:  our desires vary in 
order that our actions will pro duce different results at different times.  The role of 
beliefs is to do with the fact that, given any result, different means are appropriate to 
that result at different times:  our beliefs vary in order that we can choose the most 
effective me ans at any time to the results that we desire at that time. 
In the end, all selection-based purposes depend on results: to have a purpose is to 
have been selected by a mechanism which favours certain results. However, the above 
remarks show that this is true of beliefs only in an indirect sense.  For beliefs don't 
have any results of their own.  Rather, their standard purpose is to produce whichever 
results will satisfy the desires they are acting in concert with.&nb sp; In effect, beliefs 
get selected at one remove, in virtue of being good at causing actions which cause 
desired results. 
 Note that this means that, according to the teleological theory, there is a sense in 
which the representational pow ers of desires are prior to those of beliefs.  Any given 
desire will be present in order to produce a certain result r, which result is therefore its 
satisfaction condition.  Given this explanation of satisfaction for desires, we can then 
explai n the purposes of beliefs.  Any given belief will be present in order to produce 
actions which will produce desired results if a certain condition p obtains, which 
condition is therefore that belief's truth condition.5
 Let us now return to the example with which I began this section.  I have just argued 
that the biological purpose of any belief is to be present in those circumstances in 
which the actions it prompts will satisfy desires --  which circumstanc es therefore 
count as its truth condition.  However, the example about not flinching in battle 
involves a different kind of purpose.  For in this case the belief at issue, the belief that 
you won't be injured, has a extra biological purpose, apa rt from its role in aiding the 
satisfaction of desires, namely, to ensure that you do not flinch in battle. 
 In order to deal with such examples, we need to distinguish the "normal" purpose of 
beliefs, namely, to ensure the satisfaction of desires, from such "special" purposes as 
stopping you flinching in battle.  This distinction then allows us to frame the 
teleological theory in a way which is consistent with the existence of such special 
purposes.  That is, we should understan d the teleological theory as relating 
specifically to the normal purpose of beliefs.  For, as long as we stick to those normal 
purposes, then truth is still the requirement for achieving them, in line with the 
teleological theory of representation.6
 If you are unconvinced that the belief about invulnerability needs to be true in order 
to serve its "normal" function, consider the case, say, of Cuthbert Coward.  Cuthbert 
would far rather remain unscratched th an win the battle.  Still, if Cuthbert were 
somehow to be persuaded that he won't be injured (though in fact he will), then even 
he might be induced to enter the fray. But then he won't get what he desires, which is 
above all to remain unscathed.&nbs p; It is only the special purpose of getting him to 
fight, even though he's doesn't really want to, that gets satisfied when the belief is 
false.  By contrast, the normal purpose, of satisfying his desire to remain unscathed, 
still requires his belie f to be true --  just as the teleological theory, as now proposed, 
requires. 
 Of course, Cuthbert has somewhat unsatisfactory desires, from a biological point of 
view, in the sense that the satisfaction of his desires is unlikel y to further his overall 
chances of survival and reproduction.  This is why beliefs sometimes have special 
purposes.  The point of these special purposes is in effect to by-pass the normal role 
of beliefs in satisfying desires, and to ensure ins tead that agents with biologically 
inappropriate desires don't end up performing biologically inappropriate 
actions.  Cowards are a case in point.  Their unfortunate desires mean that they are 
likely to end up running from battle, and thus losin g the any chance of biologically 
important spoils, just in order to avoid a scratch.  And so, in order to protect them 
against the biological dangers of such consequences, natural selection predisposes 
them to believe that they are invulnerable, even when the evidence doesn't warrant 
this belief, so as to stop them performing those actions which would in fact satisfy 
their desires. 
 It might seem puzzling that natural selection should give some beliefs two different 
purposes.  Af ter all, natural selection presumably designs biological systems for one 
ultimate end, namely, the bequest of genes.  So why don't beliefs simply have the 
single purpose of ensuring such gene bequests? 
 The answer relates once more to the nature of the human decision-making 
system.  Note that this system doesn't work by always choosing that action which is 
most likely to ensure gene bequests.  Rather it chooses that action which is most likely 
to satisfy existing desires.&nb sp; It is not impossible to imagine biological systems 
of the former kind, which always aimed directly for gene bequests.  But it seems 
likely that the limitations of our cognitive capacities have prevented us from doing 
things in this way.  Ins tead we aim for such relatively short-term goals as warmth, 
sex and chocolate ice-cream. 
 By and large such short-term goals correlate reasonably well with ultimate 
biological success, which is no doubt why our innate desires, and our ways of 
acquiring non-innate desires, have evolved as they have.  But the satisfaction of our 
desires won't always coincide with biological success (not all sex leads, or even can 
lead, to reproduction).  And this then means that there are certain b iological risks 
consequent on our way of doing things.  Now, it may be that some of these risks are 
inevitable by-products of our desire-based decision-making system:  for example, it 
may be inevitable that humans will have extremely strong desi res to avoid injuries, 
and so inevitable that in certain circumstances this will lead them to act against their 
biological interests.  And this will then lead to natural selection interfering with the 
normal operation of decision-making system, by gi ving us beliefs which lead us to 
act in ways that frustrate our desires, but satisfy our biological needs. 
 Let me sum up the argument of this section.  Certain beliefs do indeed have some 
biological purposes that require them to be f alse.  However, this doesn't invalidate the
teleological theory of representation.  For we can understand the teleological theory as 
focusing specifically on the normal purposes of beliefs, namely, to guarantee the 
satisfaction of desires.  And these normal purposes don't ever require beliefs to be
false. 
3.5  The Reality of Beliefs and Desires
In the last section I made a number of definite assumptions about the role of beliefs 
and desires in our o verall decision-making system.  Some readers may want to ask 
how this tallies with the agnostic attitude to everyday psychology I expressed in 
chapter 1, when I said that my references to the entities of everyday psychology 
should be understood merel y as place holders for the true theoretical explanation of 
human cognition, whatever that may be. 
 One possible response to this query would be to maintain that the last section's 
comments about the roles of beliefs and desires need not be read realistically, as 
committing me to substantial claims about the causal structure of our cognitive 
system. Daniel Dennett, for instance, argues (1971, 1978, 1987) that everyday 
psychology commits us only to the "intentional stance", to the view that an 
individual's behaviour is somehow appropriate to his or her environment and needs, 
and not to any "design" or "physical" assumptions about the mechanisms that might 
be responsible for generating that behaviour.  Dennett holds that this inten tional 
stance is underpinned by general evolutionary considerations, which tell us that our 
cognitive systems must have some design that will enable us to choose actions that 
will further our welfare, while leaving open the internal details of that design .  On 
Dennett's conception, then, references to such everyday concepts as belief and desire 
need not be taken as realistic hypotheses about internal structures, but simply as a way 
of pointing to the approriateness of actions. 
 Howeve r, I shall not take this Dennettian line.  For one thing, it sits ill with the 
teleological theory of representation.  According to the teleological theory, the 
representational contents of beliefs and desires depend on how (the abilities to for m) 
these states have been shaped by natural selection.  But if beliefs and desires aren't 
real states, but only constructs by which we indicate the appropriateness of actions to 
circumstances, then it is hard to see how natural selection can operate on 
them.  Natural selection favours things which produce certain effects.  But it can't 
favour things which don't exist.7
 In any case, there is good reason to doubt Dennett's view that everyday psychology 
is restricte d to the "intentional stance".  This relates to a point made in the last 
section.  As we saw, natural selection hasn't arranged our brains so that we always 
choose actions that are likely to maximize gene bequests.  Instead it has fixed on 
certain relatively short-term goals, like warmth and sex, and on certain ways of 
acquiring further short-term goals, and arranged for our brains to choose actions 
which are likely at least to satisfy these goals. 
 As I observed at the end of the last section, this makes sense from the point of view 
of natural selection, given that these short-term goals correlate reasonably well with 
long-term reproductive success, whereas aiming directly for such long-term
reproductive success would no do ubt overtax our cognitive capacities (not to mention 
the cognitive capacities of our evolutionary ancestors).  But the fact that the 
installation of short-term desires constitutes a sensible strategy from the point of view
of natural selection should n't obscure the fact that it is a definite design option, a 
choice of one among a number of different possible internal structures which could 
ensure that behaviour is more or less appropriate to needs and environment.  After all, 
we can easily enoug h imagine hyper-intelligent non-human beings whom natural 
selection had made "super-rational", by giving them no short-term desires as such, but 
simply the sole aim of maximizing gene bequests by always choosing that action 
which available information ind icated as most likely to achieve that end.  And, at the 
other extreme, we already have terrestrial examples of simple organisms, like insects, 
with plenty of hard-wired routines driven by short-term needs, but scarcely any ability 
to modify their beh aviour in response to information about the environment. 
 So everyday psychology, with its distinction between beliefs and desires, takes us 
beyond the thought that evolution has somehow arranged that we will choose actions 
appropriate to our needs and environment, to a specific theory of how evolution has 
arranged this:  evolution has arranged for us to have information about our 
circumstances, in the form of our current beliefs, and then to choose actions which 
those beliefs indicat e will satisfy the goals signalled by our current desires.  In these 
respects we are different from the "super-rationalists", since they are not interested in 
any intermediate goals except gene bequests;  and we are different from the insects, i 
n that their behaviour is almost entirely insensitive to information about their 
circumstances. 
 In the light of these points, I accept that my appeal to beliefs and desires in the last 
section does indeed take me beyond the stance of chap ter 1, and commit me to the 
truth of certain basic everyday psychological assumptions as realistic 
hypotheses.  However, now that we have seen why this commitment is inescapable, 
we can also see why it is unburdensome.  For there is plenty of un contentious 
empirical evidence that everyday psychology is true at just those points where it takes 
us beyond Dennett's intentional stance.  The significant point is not just that everyday 
psychology says that we are different from the super-rational ists and the insects in 
having an internal structure of beliefs and desires;  in addition, our actual behaviour 
shows that we are different in this respect.  If we didn't differ from the super-
rationalists in having desires, then we wouldn't con tinue to act in pursuit of short-
term aims, like eating chocolate, even after we know that doing so only makes us fat 
and so is no help to our reproductive success;  and if we didn't differ from the insects 
in having beliefs, we wouldn't be able to f igure out that one way to acquire some 
chocolate would be to go to the new confectionery shop around the corner.8
 This kind of general evidence does not of course confirm  every detail of the 
complex set of assumptions and attitudes which constitute our everyday psychological 
thinking.  But it does seem to me to be enough to justify the kind of core assumptions 
about the existence of beliefs and desires that I made in the last section.  Empirical 
psychology still has much to discover, both about the more detailed claims made by 
everyday psychology, and about the "sub-personal" structures by which such 
everyday psychological claims are implemented.  But I don't think it need do anything 
further to establish t hat human acions are generated by internal causal processes 
involving beliefs and desires.  If our actions were not generated in this way, we would 
behave quite differently from the way we know we do behave.9
3.6 Truth as the Guarantee of Success
In section 3.4 I stressed that the teleological theory of representation needs to be 
understood as focusing specifically on the role that beliefs play in facilitating the 
satisfaction of desires, rather than on any further role they may have in fulfilling 
further biological purposes. However, once we focus on desire satisfaction in this way, 
then do we still need teleology to explain truth-conditional content? Why not simply 
explain content directly, by saying it is that property of beliefs which will ensure the 
satisfaction of desires? 
At the beginning of this chapter I argued that functionalism leaves out representation, 
and that the teleological theory is needed to bring it back in. But perhaps the moral of 
my remarks in 3.4 about the relation between belief content and desire satisfaction is 
that we shouldn't start with functionalism in the first place. For what those remarks in 
effect show is that functionalism presents only a limited picture of the role that mental 
states play in psychological explanation, a picture which leaves out the role of truth in 
ensuring the satisfaction of desires. Perhaps once we fill in the missing components of 
the picture, we won't any longer need teleology to explain representation. 
 In due course I shall show that this is not so: even after we have paid due accord to 
the role of truth in ensuring desire satisfaction, we will still need teleology for a full 
explanation of representation. But it will be worth proceding slowly. 
The limitations of functionalism can be brought out by contrasting two different 
pictures of the structure of action explanation.  The first picture, the picture embodied 
in functionalism, focuses on the internal roles that beliefs and desires play in causing 
behaviour, and so takes psychological explanation to conform to this pattern: 
(A)  X desires G 
 X believes that F will produce G 
 ___________ 
&n bsp;  X does F. 
 However, there is also a second picture of the structure of action explanation, a 
picture embodied in my remarks about the human decision-making 
system.  According to this pict ure, psychological explanation is not solely an internal 
matter, but also has an "external" structure, which explains, not behaviour, but the 
achievement of results: 
(B)  X desires G 
 ;  X believes, of some behaviour, that it will 
 produce G 
 This belief is true 
 __________ 
 X achi eves G. 
 If we restrict our attention to "internal" explanations of form (A), as functionalism 
does, then it scarcely surprising that we become puzzled about the significance of 
representational notions, since the only role that beliefs an d desires play in (A) is that 
of causal pushes from the inside, as it were, and not as representers of the external 
world.  But in "external" explanations of form (B), the representational features of 
beliefs and desires become crucial:  the sat isfaction condition of the desire specifies 
what external result is at issue, the truth condition of the belief specifies how things 
must be to ensure this result, and the actual truth of the belief specifies that things are 
indeed so.  Far from bein g limited to the internal causes of behaviour, explanations 
like (B) specify that external circumstances are such as to lead from the agent's 
behaviour to result G. 
 This is why we now need to ask whether we really need to appeal to teleol ogy in 
our theory of representation.  The original puzzle that led us to this theory was, in 
effect, that internal explanations like (A) make no use of representational 
notions.  But now we see that external explanations like (B) do use represen tational 
notions.  And this suggests that we might be able to analyse representational notions 
purely in terms of the way they enter into such external explanations -- explaining 
truth, say, as that property which ensures desire satisfaction -- witho ut needing to 
appeal to teleological considerations after all. 
 In a moment I shall explain why this doesn't quite work.  But let me deal with a 
minor point first.  There is a extensive literature on the question of whether 
representat ional notions are essential to (B).  (See Loar 1981; Devitt, 1984; Field, 
1986.)  Can't an explanation like (B) always be replaced by a two-stage explanation 
which first explains behaviour F, as in (A), and then explains G by reference to the fa 
ct that F causes G, and thereby omits any explicit mention of truth?  Well, maybe 
so.  But the obvious question is why we should want to dispense with truth in this 
way.  The answer, for most of the contributions to the relevant literature, is to do with 
"deflationary" or "minimalist" theories of truth:  defenders of such theories are 
committed to the replacability of (B)s by (A)s, since they think that mention of truth is 
always simply a "quotational" variant of what can be said in di squoted terms;  while 
opponents of such theories want to show that (B)s involve ineliminable appeal to truth 
as a real property of beliefs.  My present concerns, however, are orthogonal to this 
debate.  I am not concerned to decide how far talk of truth might be eliminable in 
favour of something else, but simply to take it at face value, and understand what 
work it does in our thinking about the world.  The question at hand is not whether we 
can do without truth, but what we do with it .  (As it happens, I think that replacing 
(B)s by (A)s loses sight of a general explanatory pattern, the pattern displayed in 
schema (B).  On the other hand, I don't think that this is the most effective way to 
argue against the deflationary the ory, given that arguments based on the importance 
of explanatory patterns are notoriously inconclusive.  A better strategy is to press the 
deflationalist for a theory of translational content.  I shall return to this issue in section 
3.9 below.) 
 The question currently at issue is whether we can analyse representational notions 
simply on the basis of the way that they enter into external explanations like (B), and 
without appeal to teleological considerations.  Let us consider in more detail how this 
might work. The idea, in outline, is that truth conditional content might be analysed in 
terms of the role of truth in ensuring desire satisfaction. We can formulate this 
suggestion explicitly as follows: 
(C)  The truth condition, for any belief, is that 
 condition which guarantees that actions based on 
 that belief will satisfy the desires it is acting 
 in concert with. 
 Something like this success-guaranteeing analysis of truth has been p roposed by a 
number of other writers (Ramsey, 1927, p 29; Putnam, 1978, part 3; Appiah 1986; 
Mellor 1988;  Whyte, 1990.) However, there is an obvious reason why it is not, as it 
stands, an adequate substitute for the teleological theory. Namely, that it explains 
truth, for beliefs, only by assuming the notion of satisfaction, for desires.  Yet 
satisfaction is as much a representa tional notion as truth, and so ought itself to be 
explained by an adequate philosophical theory of representation. 
 It is no good simplying offering an account of desire satisfaction parallel to (C), 
such as: 
(D)  The satisf action conditon of a desire is that 
 condition which is guaranteed to result from 
 actions based on that desire, if the beliefs behind 
 the action are tr ue. 
For simply adding (D) to (C), without offering any further hold on representational 
notions, is like trying to solve a single equation with two unknowns.  Both (C) and (D) 
are expressions of the principle: 
(E)  Actions based on true beliefs will satisfy the 
 desires they are aimed at. 
(E) places a mutual constraint on the representational values that a person's beliefs 
and desires can have.  But on its own it does not suffice to pin do wn those values 
uniquely.  If a given attribution of truth and satisfaction conditions satisfies (E), then 
so will any attribution that simply permutes referents for names and predicates, 
provided it does so in the same way in both truth and satisfac tion conditions.  (Cf 
Stalnaker, 1984, pp 17-18; Papineau, 1984, p 555.) 
 This means is that any theory of representation that explains truth by (C) needs to 
add something further --  not just (D) --  to explain satisfaction.  I add teleology.  I 
explain desire satisfaction in terms of the results that desires are biologically supposed 
to produce, and then plug this into (C), thus giving truth the biological purpose of 
satisfying desires. 
There are perhaps other possible options at this point.  You might agree with the 
success-guaranteeing account of truth, as in (C), and agree that something extra is 
needed, yet disagree that the requisite addition is teleology.  However, let us postpone 
the question of whether (C) can be appropriately supplemented in non-teleological 
ways until the section after next.  For the prior question is whether (C) is even 
defensible as part of a full account of representation.  There a num ber of standard 
objections to the idea that truth is what guarantees desire satisfaction, which both the 
teleological theorist and those who want to supplement (C) in other ways need to 
answer.  It will be convenient at this point to deal with these objections. 
3.7  Objections to a Success-Guaranteeing Account of Truth
(i)  Non-Instrumental Beliefs
Doesn't (C) apply only to beliefs of the form: s will bring about t?  For these are the 
only beliefs which are directly relevant to the satisfaction of desires, as schema (B) 
makes clear.  Surely, however, an analysis of truth conditions ought to deal with 
beliefs of all forms, and not just with beliefs about me ans to ends. 
 It is not difficult, however, to see why (C) should be considered to hold for beliefs 
of all forms, as well as for means-ends beliefs.  It is true that the relevance of beliefs 
to actions always depends in the last insta nce on what they imply about appropriate 
means.  And in this sense it is only means-ends beliefs that are directly relevant to 
actions.  But, still, such means-end beliefs, that s will bring about t, will as a rule be 
inferred by the agent from various other beliefs.  And this then institutes the requisite 
general connection between truth and satisfaction.  For if those other beliefs are true, 
and the inferences from them valid, then the belief that s will bring about t will be true 
to o, and the resulting action will succeed.  So it is a general principle that actions 
based on true beliefs will succeed, and not just a principle about means-ends beliefs as 
such.10  Consequently, when we invert this principle into an analysis of truth 
conditions --  analysis (C) --  the analysis promises to apply to beliefs in general, and 
not just to beliefs of the means-end form. 
(ii)  Actions Based on More Than One Belief
In general a number of beliefs will lie behind any given action.  But this means that 
the truth of any one belief will be insufficient to guarantee the success of ensuing 
actions.  For desire satisfaction will only be guaranteed if the other beliefs behind the 
action are also true.  So strictly analysis (C) ought to be formulated: 
 The truth condition, for any belief, is that 
 condition which guarantees that actions bas ed on 
 that belief will satisfy the desires it is acting 
 in concert with, assuming that any other beliefs it 
 is also acting in concert with are true as well. 
But this then disqualifies (C) as analysis of truth-conditional representation, for it
assumes the notion of truth in explaining it. 
 It might seem that we could deal with this difficulty by thinking of analysis (C) as 
applying specifically to cases where single beliefs generate actions on their own, 
without the assistance of other beliefs (cf Mellor, 1988, p 86).  Truth conditions could 
then be identified as what guarantees satisfaction in such single-belief cases.  B ut the 
trouble with this is that we then run into objection (1) again, since the only kind of 
beliefs that can generate actions on their own are means-ends beliefs.  If we want an 
analysis of truth that works for beliefs in general, and not just for means-ends beliefs, 
then we need a way of extending (C) beyond single-belief choices of action. 
 A better way to deal with the problem is to think of analysis (C) as being applied 
simultaneously to all the belief types in an agent's repert oire.  That is, we should 
think of (C) as fixing the truth conditions for all those beliefs collectively by, as it 
were, solving a set of simultaneous equations.  The "equations" are the assumptions 
that the truth condition of each belief will g uarantee desire satisfaction, if other 
relevant beliefs are true;  the overall "solution" is then a collective assignment of truth 
conditions which satsifies all those equations. 
(iii)  Can't False Beliefs Satisfy Desi res?
Another initial worry about (C) might be that it makes truth too easy.  Surely we don't 
want to count beliefs as true whenever the actions they prompt have satisfactory 
results.  Can't an action achieve a desired result by acciden t, even though some of the 
beliefs behind it are false (as when they involve some self-correcting mistake)? 
 But (C) doesn't in fact rule out this possibility.  The suggestion isn't that it's enough, 
for the truth of a set of token be liefs, that a particular action, prompted by those 
particular tokens, should satisfy desires.  Rather (C) specifies a condition which 
guarantees, for all tokens of the relevant types, that ensuing actions will satisfy desires. 
(iv) Decisions Made Under Uncertainty
In many case an agent will act, not on full beliefs, but on partial beliefs. In such cases 
the agent's thinking won't pick out any action as certain to satisfy desires, but rather 
selec t the action that is subjectively most likely to satisfy desires.  But then, if the 
action does succeed, that won't have been guaranteed by the truth of the agent's beliefs 
about the world. 
 It is an interesting question as to how far the well-foundedness of decisions made 
under uncertainty depends on objective features of the world, such as the existence of 
objective chances.  But we can by-pass this issue here.  For, once more, there is 
nothing in (C) which rules out the p ossibility of actions whose success isn't 
guaranteed by the truth of the beliefs behind them.  The idea behind (C) is rather that 
we should focus on the kind of case where success is so guaranteed, and then analyse 
truth as what guarantees desire sat sifaction in just those cases.  So uncertain decisions 
issuing from partial beliefs are beside the point.  To apply (C) to a given belief, we 
should stick to cases where that belief is held fully, and figures in decisions which 
aren't uncertain:  truth is what guarantees satisfaction in those cases.11
(v)  Is Truth Just Pragmatic?
Analysis (C) seems to imply that the virtue of truth is essentially pragmatic, that the 
reason for wanting tr uth is always so as to satisfy desires.  But surely truth can be 
pursued as an end in itself, and not just because of its pragmatic value.  Indeed there 
are certain questions, about the farther reaches of the universe, say, or the distant past, 
where our interest in having true beliefs can't possibly be practical, since such beliefs 
can make no difference to our actions. 
 But this complaint misses its target.  (C) isn't a theory about why we should want 
truth.  It's a t heory of what truth is:  namely, for a belief, the obtaining of a condition 
which guarantees that, if an agent were to act on that belief, the ensuing action would 
satisfy desires.  This doesn't presuppose that anybody will actually act on the b 
elief.  Nor does it presuppose that the only reason for wanting the truth in respect of 
that belief is to be able to act so as to satsify desires.  To be sure, if you do want to 
satisfy desires, then (C) does immediately imply that you have a mo tive for wanting 
the beliefs behind it to be true.  But that leaves room for other motives for wanting 
truth, both in the case of practically significant beliefs and practically insignificant 
ones.  In particular, it leaves room for truth to be valued as an end in itself.  (Can't we 
now ask:  why should truth be valued as an end in itself?  But I take it to be a virtue of 
(C) that it allows this as a significant question.) 
 It might still seem that there are some b eliefs that couldn't, even counterfactually, 
be relevant to an action satisfying a desire.  What about the belief that there are no 
agents, or the belief that all my actions are doomed to failure?12  At this point we need 
to appeal to the compositionality of beliefs.  As I shall explain in section 3.9, we need 
to recognize that beliefs are made up of components ("concepts"), the representational 
significance of which derives from their systematic contribution to the truth conditi 
ons of the beliefs they enter into, that is, from their systematic contribution to 
conditions which guarantee that actions based on those beliefs will satisfy 
desires.  Once we recognize this, then we can hope to pin down the representational 
signifi cance of concepts like agent, doomed to failure, and so on, in terms of their 
contribution to beliefs which can be relevant to action, and then use those 
representational values to build up truth conditions for such special beliefs as can't be 
relevant to action. 
(vi)  Non-Natural Beliefs
Analysis (C) applies only to beliefs whose truth is of potential causal relevance to the 
success of actions. Perhaps this will enable it to accommodate beliefs about the 
natural world.  ; But what about moral, or modal, or mathematical judgements?  In 
what sense, if any, can the truth of such non-natural judgements matter to the success 
of action? 
 I don't propose to pursue this complex topic at this point.  Whe ther or not analysis 
(C) might apply to a given category of judgement depends on the details of the 
workings of such judgements, and such details are matters of active controversy for 
moral, modal, and mathematical judgements.  I shall offer some fur ther comments on 
these issues in chapter 6 below. 
(viii) Doesn't (C) Presuppose Validity and Hence Truth?
In my answer to objection (i) I appealed to the notion of validity:  I argued that 
analysis (C) could be ex tended from means-ends beliefs to other beliefs because valid 
inferences from true beliefs of any kind will lead to true conclusions about 
appropriate means.  However, it might be argued that this appeal to validity is 
illegitimate, on the grounds th at the notion of valdity presupposes the notion of truth. 
 Analysis (C) certainly needs the notion of validity.  Often agents will draw invalid 
inferences about means (imagine that they have to decide what to do quickly, or that 
their situation is very complicated) and then the truth of the beliefs on which those 
inferences are based won't guarantee the success of their actions.  So if analysis (C) is 
to apply generally, and not just to means-end beliefs, it should strictly be fo rmulated 
as: 
 The truth condition of any belief is that 
 condition which guarantees that actions validly 
 based on th at belief will satisfy desires. 
But this now makes the problem clear:  (C) can scarcely be held to constitue an 
analysis of truth, if it presupposes validity and validity presupposes truth. 
 One possible move here might be to deny y that validity does depend on truth.  Thus 
we might seek some purely syntactic notion of validity, defined in terms of some 
specified structure of rules of inference, rather than the semantic notion of any truth-
preserving form of inference.  Ho wever, this syntactic strategy seems 
unpromising.  For a start, there are technical difficulties about the completeness of 
syntactic characterizations of non-first-order validity.  And, in any case, given that 
syntactic characterizations are alw ays answerable to the semantic conception of 
validity (cf Dummett, 1974), even for first-order validity, it is doubtful that the 
syntactic strategy will really dispose of the circularity, rather than just brushing it 
under the carpet. 
 To deal with this difficulty, I think it is necessary to broaden the focus away from 
analysis (C) itself, and reintroduce teleological considerations.  We need to think of 
validity as playing a part, alongside truth and desire satisfaction, in fulfillin g the 
biological purposes of the overall human decision-making system. 
 It is fairly obvious, on reflection, that this decision-making system needs some 
mechanism for generating beliefs about means, beliefs that are directly relevant to ac 
tions, from the total set of background beliefs that may bear indirectly on the 
achievability of desires.  And it will clearly be part of the biological purpose of this 
mechanism to produce true beliefs about such means, given that the background bel 
iefs are true.  Of course this inferential mechanism won't always succeed in fulfilling 
this purpose:  as I just observed, humans often draw invalid conclusions about which 
means to adopt.  But that doesn't show that validity isn't the infe rential mechanism's 
purpose, any more than heart failures show that blood circulation isn't the heart's 
purpose. 
 As I mentioned earlier (see footnote 5), the biological purposes of beliefs and 
desires are interdependent, in the sense that desires will only fulfil their biological 
purposes if beliefs fulfil theirs, and vice versa.  We now see that there is a further 
interdependency, in that both beliefs and desires will only fulfil their biological 
purposes if the inferential mechanis m fulfils its purpose too, and vice versa.  There is 
of course nothing surprising about such interdependencies.  They are a common 
feature of biological systems.  For example, the lungs will only fulfil their biological 
purpose, of oxygenat ing the blood, if the heart fulfils its purpose, of circulating the 
blood, and vice versa. 
 It might not be immediately clear how these observations about biological purposes 
are supposed to solve the original problem.  Don't they jus t amplify the point that 
truth, in beliefs, and validity, in inferences, presuppose each other, thereby blocking 
any possiblity of explaining one in terms of the other?  But the point of reintroducing 
biological considerations is not to deny this int erdependence, but rather to show how 
we can analyse truth and validity simultaneously. 
 Suppose we start off not presupposing any representational terms like "truth" or 
"validity".  We proceed to describe the workings of the human dec ision-making 
system.  It has various interdependent components:  some states (desires) have the 
biological purpose of prompting actions which will produce specific results;  others 
(beliefs) have the biological purpose of prompting actions which are appropriate to 
specific circumstances, and hence the biological purpose of co-varying with those 
circumstances;  and then there is an (inferential) mechanism whose purpose is to 
generate new beliefs out of old ones, under the constraint tha t the circumstances 
which the latter beliefs are supposed to co-vary with should be guaranteed by the 
circumstances the former beliefs are supposed to co-vary with.  And then having done 
all that, without using the notions of "truth" and "validity", we can now account for 
these notions, by saying that beliefs are true when they fulfil their purpose of co-
varying with the relevant circumstances, and that inferences are valid when they fulfil 
their purpose of preserving such truth. 
3.8 Alternative Accounts of Desire Satisfaction
This completes my catalogue of standard objections to the success-guaranteeing 
account of truth-conditional content given by (C). My answer to the last objection 
returns us to th e point at which we left the overall argument.  For this answer dealt 
with the difficulty about validity by locating (C) within the biological analysis of the 
overall human decision-making system.  But we have already noted, at the end of the 
se ction before last, a rather more straightforward reason for making this 
move.  Namely, that (C) on its own simply explains truth, for beliefs, in terms of 
satisfaction, for desires, and therefore needs supplementation by an independent 
account of des ire satisfaction.  My earlier suggestion was that we should fill this gap 
too by placing (C) within the biological context of the overall human decision-making 
system.  For this move then allows us to view desires as having a biological purpose, 
namely to prompt actions which produce specific results, and so enables us to analyse 
desire satisfaction in terms of this purpose. 
 A question raised when I made this suggestion was whether this is the only way to 
remedy the philosophica l incompleteness of (C).  Couldn't opponents agree with the 
rest of my argument, but disagree about the teleology?  That is, couldn't they agree 
that (C) is only part of the truth about truth, which therefore needs to be supplemented 
with some f urther account of desire satisfaction, but then diverge by offering some 
different explanation of satisfaction for desires, which does not appeal to 
considerations of biological purpose? 
 For example, they might try to identify the results which satisfy desires as those 
which extinguish those desires (cf Russell, 1921, ch 3; Whyte, 1991).  In general, 
when some desired result is achieved, then that desire disappears.  So perhaps we can 
identify which results are the objects of wh ich desires by reference to which results 
make those desires go away. 
 Another alternative would be to appeal to the reinforcement of behaviour (cf 
Dretske, 1988).  Often, when a desire prompts some behaviour which produces a 
given re sult, that behaviour is reinforced, in the sense that it is more likely to be 
repeated when that desire next arises.  So perhaps we can identifie the results which 
satisfy desires as those results whose achievement leads to the reinforcement of behav 
iour. 
 One problem facing theories of this kind is that they will still face the problem about 
validity raised at the end of the last section.  I dealt with this problem by viewing 
inferential abilities as part of the overall biologic al system, and accounting for 
validity in terms of the biological purpose of this ability.  Accounts which seek to 
dispense with considerations of biological purpose obviously cannot offer this 
solution.  Yet they will still face the problem, fo r merely adding an independent 
account of desire satisfaction to (C) will still leave us with the problem that (C), if it is 
to work at all, needs implicitly to presuppose an idea of validity, and hence of truth.13
 There are ot her problems facing the alternative suggestions about desire 
satisfaction.  Take the "extinction theory" of satisfaction first.  On the face of it, some 
desires are only fuelled their own satisfaction (salted peanuts), while others are 
quenched by their non-satisfaction (sour grapes).  Perhaps an  extinction theory can 
somehow be elaborated so as to deal with these prima facie counter-examples.  But 
until this is done, the teleological theory seems to offer a far more powerful and 
promising approach to desire satisfaction. 
 As to the "reinforcement theory", it seems odd to view this as a more fundamental 
account of desire satisfaction than that provided by the teleological theory.  The 
pheneomenon at issue is that a given action X prompted by a given desire will tend to 
be repeated just in case that action gives rise to a given result G --  which result the 
reinforcement theory therefore counts as the desire's satisfaction condition.  Now, 
such reinforcement is certainly a genuine phenomenon.  But consider it from a 
biological point of view.  From the biological perspective, reinforcement of some 
means X amounts to an alternative route to achieving G, alongside the cognitive 
procedure of noticing that in general X leads to G and acting on this belief.  That is, 
natural selection in effect sometimes arranges for us to acquire a derived desire for X 
in itself, instead of leaving it to our cognitive system to choose X on the basis o f our 
prior desire for G and the explicit belief that X is an effective means to G. 
 This suggests, however, that reinforcement is, in evolutionary terms, a relatively 
primitive method of generating actions.  In section 3.5 above I ha d occasion to 
observe that we human beings fall short of the kind of biological "super-rationality" 
which would always choose actions on the basis of explicit beliefs about the most 
effective way to maximize gene bequests.  But at the same time I poi nted out that we 
have moved some way in this direction, in that we are capable of doing things which 
we do not desire in themselves, simply because we believe them to be means to things 
we do desire.  To this extent, then, we are more sophisticated t han organisms who 
rely entirely on reinforcement, and whose only way of benefitting from evidence that 
X is normally followed by G would be to acquire a derived desire for X. 
 In view of our greater sophistication in this respect, it would be surprising if our 
successes in achieving desires were always followed by the reinforcement of the 
means adopted.  Given that we humans can select actions as a result of deliberation as 
well as conditioning, such automatic reinforcement would be b oth unnecessary and 
potentially disadvantageous.  And in fact it doesn't always happen.  Even after much 
experience of satisfying my desire for chocolate by going to the corner shop, I do not 
find that I have any desire to vist the corner shop a s an end in itself. 
 This implies that the reinforcement theory cannot suffice as an account of desire 
satisfaction.  To the extent that some desires can be satisfied without the means 
adopted being reinforced, as in this last example , we will be unable to equate the 
satisfaction conditons of those desires with results which lead to the reinforcement of 
means. If we want a theory of satisfaction that works across the board, we will do 
better concentrate on those results which desires are suppose to produce when they 
combine with beliefs in the deliberate choice of actions. 
3.9  Do We Need Reified Truth Conditions?
In this section I want to focus on the ontological commitments of the account of 
representation I have developed so far.  (It will be convenient to concentrate on 
beliefs, but most of the points which follow could be applied to desires too.)  We can 
summarize the account of truth conditional content we have now arrived at a s follows: 
 (F)  The truth condition, for any belief, is that 
 condition which guarantees that actions generated 
 by that belief will fulfil i ts biological purpose 
 of satisfying desires. 
Note, however, that this analysis (F) (like (C) before it) refers to "truth conditions", 
and implicitly views truth itself as a matter of such conditions "obta ining".  This 
creates a prima facie problem.  For such talk, if taken at face value, commits us to 
dubious entities like propositions, or possible states of affairs, or sets of possible 
worlds. 
 Some philosophers would be untroub led by commitments to abstract objects like 
propositions and sets.  They can skip ahead to the next section.  But I am unhappy 
with such commitments, for reasons to be given in chapter 6 below, and so in this 
section I want to try to show that t he reification of truth conditions is not essential to 
(F). 
 My argument so far implies that, for any belief-type in an individual's repertoire, an 
instance of the following schema will hold: 
(G)  actions generated by that belief will fulfil the belief's purpose of satisfying 
desires if and only if p 
Given this, then one way of understanding analysis (F) is as asserting that claims of 
the form (G) specify the truth-conditional contents of beliefs.  That is, analysis (F) c 
an be understood as asserting that (G) is an equivalent substitute for: 
(H)  the belief in question is true if and only if p. 
Note now that neither (G) nor (H) refer to truth conditions as such.  So if the import of 
analysis (F) is simpl y that (G) is equivalent to (H), then analysis (F) will be free of 
any substantial commitment to truth conditions too. 
 What we want from analysis (F) is a theory of content for beliefs.  That is, we want 
an analysis which explains wh at it is for a belief to have a truth-conditional content, 
and which therefore gives us a recipe for determining the specific content of any 
given belief.  But we can achieve all this without reifying truth-conditions as objects 
which attach to belie fs.  For we can simply understand (F) as saying that claims like 
(H), about truth-conditional content, can always be replaced by claims like (G), about 
biological purposes.  I shall understand (F) in this way from now on. 
 There is a well-known difficulty facing this kind of approach.  If we take (G) at 
face value, and in particular don't read "if and only if" in an inadmissibly intensional 
way, then we ought to accept such instances as: 
 th e belief that snow is white will fulfil its 
 biological purpose if and only if grass is green. 
But this is surely unacceptable, if instances of (G) are supposed to amount to 
specifications of truth-conditional contents.&nbs p; For the truth condition of the 
belief that snow is white is certainly not that grass is green.14
The trouble here, as students of Donald Davidson's theory of meaning will know, is 
that any "standing belief", such as snow is white, is "always" true, if true at all.  So we 
can get a true instance of (G) simply by mentioning a true standing belief on the left 
hand side and placing any true statement whatsoever on the right. 
 This is where we need to recogni ze the compositionality of beliefs.  Instead of 
starting with whole beliefs, and taking analysis (F) to explain truth conditions by 
equating them directly with instances of (G), we need to start with the components of 
beliefs, such as singular concep ts, predicate concepts, ways of combining concepts, 
and so on, and to focus on the referential values of such components, in the sense of 
the contributions that such components make to the biological purposes of the beliefs 
they enter into.  Analysis (F) can then be viewed as equating truth conditions with 
conditions built up from such referential contributions.  So now we will not construct 
instances of (G) directly, but only by inference from a set of assumptions about belief 
components, assum ptions which will specify what is required for the whole beliefs 
those components enter into to generate successful actions.  And then, since we will 
now be building up the (G)-claim for the belief that snow is white, say, from 
assumptions about the systematic contribution that the concepts snow and - is white 
make to success-guaranteeing conditions across the board, we can expect to derive: 
 the belief that snow is white will fulfil its 
 biolog ical purpose if and only if snow is white 
as desired, rather than: 
 the belief that snow is white will fulfil its  biological purpose if and only if grass is 
green.15
 What now of truth itsel f?  Those who reify truth conditions as possible states of 
affairs, or sets of possible worlds, or some such, can simply say that a belief is true 
just in case its truth condition obtains (the possible state of affairs is actual, the actual 
world is one of the set of possible worlds, . . .)  But those of us who want to avoid 
reified truth conditions need to proceed more circumspectly.  My current thinking on 
this knotty issue is that we don't need anything more to understand truth itself ap art 
from an ability to generate the appropriate instance of the schema (H) for any given 
belief.  For, if we are able to do this, then we will have a recipe which tells us what is 
required for the belief that snow is white to be true, namely, that th is belief is true if 
and only if snow is white;  and what is required for the belief that grass is green to be 
true, namely, that this belief is true if and only if grass is green;  and so on, for beliefs 
in general.  And what more do we ne ed to understand truth, if we have a recipe which 
tells us what is required for the truth of any given belief? 
 This is to argue for a version of the redundancy theory of truth, according to which 
nothing more is needed to understand claim s about the truth of beliefs than to 
understand that such claims stand or fall with the claims made by the beliefs 
themselves.  It is important, however, to distinguish sharply between the redundancy 
theory of truth, in this sense, and recent "deflat ionary" theories of truth.16  The 
difference is that the redundancy theory leaves room for a substantial theory of 
content, a substantial theory of what determines the truth conditions of beliefs, 
whereas advocates of the deflationary theo ry argue that such substantial accounts of 
content are both unnecessary and misguided. 
 This difference between the redundancy and deflationary theories is best brought 
out by focusing on the question of how someone might master the abilit y "to generate 
appropriate instances of the schema (H)" --  which is how I phrased, at the end of the 
paragraph before last, the requirement which, according to the redundancy theory of 
truth, is supposed to render any further understanding of truth 
redundant.  Deflationalists argue that it is sufficient to know that the sentence +p+ 
used to identify the belief that p on the left hand side of any instance of (H) should be 
the same as the sentence +p+ used on the right to specify the requir ement for that 
belief's truth;  or, alternatively, for versions of (H) which specify truth conditions for 
sentences, that it is sufficient to know that the sentence mentioned on the left of any 
instance of (H) should be used on the right to specify t hat sentence's truth 
condition.  The redundancy theory, by contrast, is committed to no such "minimalist" 
account of how to generate instances of (H);  it may for instance be combined, as I 
would combine it, with the view that the appropriate wa y to generate instances of (H) 
is to accept (H)'s equivalence with (G), and therefore to derive (H)'s instances by 
determining the biological purposes of the relevant beliefs. 
 This shows that the redundancy theory should be viewed, not as a competitor to the 
deflationary theory, but as something on which both deflationalists and their 
opponents can agree.  That is, both sides can agree that nothing more is needed to 
understand truth itself than a recipe which will tell you for any be lief (or sentence) 
what is required for its truth.  Disagreement arises only on the further issue of what 
such a recipe need involve.  Deflationists think that we need only require that the 
same phrase appear on the left and right hand sides of (H)-claims.  Their opponents 
will contend that we do not have an adequate recipe for generating (H)-claims until 
we have a substantial theory of what determines the truth conditions of beliefs (or 
sentences). 
 On this issue there seem s to me little doubt that deflationalists are wrong.  The 
point is clearest for the analogue of (H) for sentences.  The deflationalist says that you 
will know how to generate the instances of (H) if you know that the sentence 
mentioned on the le ft hand side of any instance should be used on the right hand 
side.  But of course this only works if the sentence mentioned is in the language you 
speak, so that you can use it on the right hand side.  To get a notion of truth that 
applies to s entences in general, and not just sentences of your own language, the 
deflationalist needs to add that you will get an appropriate instance of (H) if the 
sentence used on the right hand side translates the sentence mentioned on the left hand 
side.  H owever, this appeal to translation destroys the deflationalist position.  For 
what is it for one sentence to translate another, in the relevant sense, except for them 
to have the same truth-conditional content?  So in order to have an adequate r ecipe 
for generating (H)-claims, you will need to grasp what it is for two sentences to have 
the same truth condition.  And it is hard to see how you can do this without a 
substantial account of what determines the truth conditions of sentences. 
 A similar point applies to the version of (H) for beliefs.  The deflationary strategy 
works fine for beliefs already identified in terms of their truth-conditional contents, as 
beliefs that p.  But for beliefs otherwise identified, in terms of causal relations, say, 
then we won't know what to put on the right hand side of the relevant instance of (H), 
unless we have a substantial theory of what determines truth conditions for beliefs in 
general. 
 So, while I think th at the redundancy theory gives the right account of truth, I also 
think that this account needs to be located within a substantial theory of 
content.17  The substantial theory of content I favour is in terms of success conditions 
and biolo gical purposes.  However, I don't necessarily want to argue that you need to 
embrace this specific theory of content to understand the notion of truth.  For I 
certainly want to leave room for lay people who do not share this philosophical theory 
of content to understand truth.  My view is that such lay people have an "everyday" or 
"folk" theory of content which is substantial enough to allow a satisfactory recipe for 
generating instances of (H), but which is philosophically inferior in vari ous respects 
to the teleological theory of content.  I shall not pursue this issue here, however, 
though I shall return to it in section 3.12 below.  For the moment we can simply note 
that the teleological theory itself is certainly a substantia l theory of content, and so a 
suitable philosophical setting for the redundancy theory of truth. 
 One last point about the redundancy theory of truth.  As I have explained it, this 
theory has the disadvantage that it does not provide an explicit analysis of the notion 
of truth.  It tells us that the belief that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white, 
and the belief that grass is green is true if and only if grass is green, . . .  But it does 
not analyse truth as a property that is common to these and other true beliefs. 
 If we build up the truth conditions for a given repetoire of beliefs recursively from 
semantic clauses for the components of those beliefs, then Tarski showed us how to 
construct a predicate which applies to all and only the truths among those 
beliefs.  This construction, however, makes essential use of set theory.  Moreover, it 
only gives us a predicate equivalent to truth-in-R (where R is the relevant repetoire of 
beli efs), not a predicate equivalent to truth for beliefs in general.  The latter problem 
can perhaps be solved by equating truth, not with truth-in-any-particular-R, but rather 
with the second-order property of satisfying-the-correct-Tarski-definition-o f-truth-in-
R-for-the-R-you-belong-to.18  There remains the commitment to set theory.  Perhaps 
there is some way of finessing this problem too.  But, rather than digressing further 
down this by-way, let me simply observe that thos e, like myself, who want to avoid 
commitment to sets, have the option of abandoning the quest for an analysis of a 
property common to all true beliefs, and simply settling for what the redundancy 
theory does undoubtedly give us, namely, knowledge of what is required for any 
given belief to be true.19 
3.10  Broad Contents Revisited
Let me now return to the issue of broad beliefs, beliefs that physical identicals can 
differ in.  As I said at the end of se ction 3.3, the theory of content developed in this 
chapter will enable us to understand why some beliefs are broad in this sense. 
 The best way to appreciate the issue of broad beliefs is to return to the contrast I 
drew between two pictur es of action explanation in section 3.5 above.  On the one 
hand were "internal" explanations, as in: 
(A)  1.  X desires that G 
 2.  X believes that F will bring about G 
 Therefore, 
 3.  X does F 
If we focus on explanations of this kind, then it is e asy to become puzzled about the 
existence of broad beliefs.  For explanations of form (A) don't require beliefs to do 
anything except give a causal push to actions from the inside, as it were.  And on this 
conception of beliefs it would indeed b e puzzling that differences outside believers' 
heads can make any difference to what they believe. 
 However, as we saw, this isn't the only kind of action explanation.  There are also 
"external" action explanations, which explain, not just means, but results: 
(B)  X desires G 
 X believes, of some behaviour, that it will 
 produce G 
 This belief is true 
 __________ 
 X achieves G 
Once we focus on thi s kind of explanation, the kind of explanation to which truth-
conditional content matters, then the existence of broad beliefs and desires becomes 
unsurprising.  Explanations of form (B) show that truth-conditions are nothing to do 
with internal push es.  Rather, they specify the conditions required for beliefs to 
satisfy desires.  Given this explanatory role, it is easy to understand why some beliefs 
should have world-dependent contents.  For such broad contents will be found 
whenever two physically identical people are in different contexts in which different 
conditions are needed to ensure that some piece of behaviour satisfies their desires. 
 The point is clearest for explicitly indexical beliefs.  Su ppose Bill and Ben are 
physically identical, and that they both have the desire and belief that they express by 
"I want to be warm" and by "Running around will make me warm".  Then they are 
both likely to start performing the same bodily movements, n amely, running 
around.  And to this extent their beliefs are the same:  both beliefs "push from the 
inside" in the same way.  But note now that the conditions that will satisfy their 
respective desires are different:  Bill's desire wil l be satisfied by Bill getting warm, 
whereas Ben's desire will be satisfied by Ben getting warm.  And because of this the 
condition required for Bill's and Ben's actions to succeed will be different:  Bill's 
action will succeed just in case Bill 's running around will make Bill warm, whereas 
the success of Ben's action requires the quite different condition than Ben's running 
around will make Ben warm.  And that is why the truth conditions of Bill's and Ben's 
beliefs are different, despite t heir physical identity.  It is simply due to the fact that 
Bill's and Ben's actions have different success conditions. 
 This kind of explanation of broadness is not restricted to explicitly indexical 
beliefs.  It will apply whene ver the satisfaction conditions of the desires of two 
physical identicals are different;  for then, as above, the truth conditions of beliefs 
germane to the satisfaction of those desires will be different too.  Given the 
teleological theory of d esire satisfaction, we can expect this phenomenon to be 
widespread, even in the absence of explicit indexicality:  for the processes which 
select desires, in genetic evolution and in individual learning, will often select desires 
because of certain e nvironment-dependent effects of those desires, effects which will 
not necessarily be present in the different environments of physically identical 
doppelgangers.  So, for example, our desire for water has arguably been selected by a 
process that favo urs actions that lead us to H2O;  by contrast, a being on a planet 
with XYZ instead of H2O could not have desires which have been selected in this 
way.  Again, it is arguable that my desire for the company of certain people, say, is 
the result o f learning processes in which those people played an essential role;  again, 
a being who had never met those people could not have developed these desires in 
this way. 
 An important special case of broad mental states will be those ac quired in the 
course of learning a public language.  Here we will find mental states whose 
biological purpose is in essential part to enable us to conform to community 
usage.  (Think of a child being encouraged when it speaks correctly, and disc ouraged 
when it makes mistakes.)  So, for example, I may acquire a concept of arthritis, whose 
biological purpose is to enable me to apply the word "arthritis" as the rest of my 
community does.  This yields another kind of reason why the mentals tates of 
physically identicals may have different contents:  for somebody may be physically 
identical to me, and yet live in a community in which "arthritis" is used differently. 
3.11 Accidental Replicas
We have just seen how the teleological theory of representation can help us to 
understand why supervenience is violated by broad beliefs and desires.  However, the 
teleological theory of representation also implies that the supervenience of the mental 
on brain physics is violated in a far more radical way, a way which is widely regarded 
as constituting a reductio ad absurdum of the teleological theory. 
 This more radical violation of supervenience arises because the teleolog ical theory 
makes representational content depend on selectional history.  The content of your 
beliefs and desires depends, according to the teleological theory, on what purposes 
they were selected to fulfil.  So it follows that another being co uld be physically 
identical to you, and yet not share your representational states, because it did not share 
a similarly structured selectional history. 
 Imagine, to make the issue graphic, that you have a physically identical 
doppelganger who does not have any selectional history at all, but who simply 
coagulated out of passing molecules a few moments ago, in some massive cosmic 
coincidence.  Then, according to the teleological theory, this doppelganger will not 
share any of your con tentful beliefs and desires, despite sharing your physical make-
up, since none of its brain states have been produced by any selection processes.  And 
this seems absurd to many philosophers.20
 An initial point that might b e made on behalf of the teleological theory is that a 
failure of mind-brain supervenience as such can scarely  refute the teleological 
theory.  After all, the example of broad beliefs and desires already shows that the 
possession of contentful s tates will often require certain kinds of context and history, 
as well as certain kinds of brain states.  So why is it at all surprising that your 
accidental replica should lack contentful states?  Of course, if we still upheld the 
philosophical view, which was widespread before the recognition of broad beliefs, 
that differences outside the head cannot matter to mental make-up, then the accidental 
replica would be a knock-down refutation of the teleological theory.  But, as it is, why 
not s imply accept that the accidental replica is another being whose idiosyncratic 
background gives it states with different contents to ours? 
 However, this reply is less than entirely persuasive.  The existence of broad beliefs 
can be de fended on independent grounds, by appeal to pre-theoretical intuitions 
which owe nothing to the teleological theory of representation.  Because of this, the 
teleological theory is confirmed by its ability to explain of the existence of broad 
beliefs.  However, there are no such pre-theoretical intuitions which show that an 
accidental replica does not have any contentful states at all;21  indeed, as I said, most 
philosophers view this implication as intuitively absurd.  So this implicati on, unlike 
the existence of broad beliefs, counts against, rather than in favour of, the teleological 
theory. 
 Perhaps defenders of the teleological theory can contest the awkward intuitions 
about the accidental replica.  Intuitions a bout complicated counterfactual situations 
are notoriously insecure.  Can we be sure, when we imagine your accidental replica, 
that we are really imagining a purely accidental being, rather than one that has 
somehow been designed, if not by natural s election, then by some supernatural power 
(such as an omnipotent philosopher who is able to create beings as required to 
illustrate philosophical points)?  If we were imagining such a designed being, then the 
intuition that it has contentful states w ould be no problem for the teleological theory, 
for designed states have purposes and so teleological contents.  Conversely, if we 
really are imagining an accidental being, then perhaps we ought therewith to relax the 
intuition that it has contentful states, which would again let the teleological theory off 
the hook. 
 I shall not develop this line of argument any further, however.  For, even if we allow 
that intuition can somehow simultaneously guarantee both that an imagined bei ng is 
genuinely accidental and that it has contentful beliefs, there is still a natural way to 
defend the teleological theory.  A defender of this theory can simply point out that the 
theory is intended as a theoretical reduction of the everyday noti on of represenational 
content, not as a piece of conceptual analysis.  And as such it can be expected to 
overturn some of the intuitive judgements we are inclined to make on the basis of the 
everyday notion.  Consider, for example, the theoretic al reduction of the everyday 
notion of a liquid, to the notion of the state of matter in which the molecules cohere 
but form no long-range order. This is clearly not a conceptual analyis of the everyday 
concept, since the everyday concept presuppose s nothing about molecular 
structure.  In consequence, this reduction corrects some of the judgements which flow 
from the everyday concept, such as the judgement that glass is not a liquid. 
 This appeal to the idea of a theoretic al reduction might strike some readers as an ad 
hoc response to the problem of the accidental replica.  But this reaction would be 
unreasonable.  For it should have been clear from the start that, if the teleological 
theory of representation is acceptable at all, it must be as a reduction, not a piece of 
conceptual analysis.  After all, there is clearly nothing about the natural selection of 
brain states in the everyday notions of beliefs and desires. 
 Perhaps the teleologic al theory of representation will one day become part of our 
everyday concept of representation.  By way of analogy, consider the aetiological 
theory of teleology itself.  When, in the nineteenth-century, biologists first started to 
understand bi ological functions in terms of their Darwinian aetiology, this was 
inevitably a matter of theoretical reduction, rather than conceptual analysis, since the 
requisite Darwinian notions were simply not available to pre-Darwinian biological 
thought.  Bu t it is arguable that in the intervening years Darwinian ideas have come 
to penetrate the concept of function itself, with the result that, to biologists, function 
now just means:  effect for which some trait has been naturally selected.  (Cf Ne ander, 
1991a.) 
 This process, of new theoretical ideas being absorbed into old concepts, is a 
common enough upshot of the general acceptance of a theoretical reduction.  So, as I 
said, perhaps one day we will all intuitively think of representation in teleological 
terms.  At which point the accidental replica will cease to be a problem, for our 
intuitions will then come to tell us that its internal states do indeed lack 
representational contents (provided, that is, that we succee d in imagining a being who 
is genuinely accidental).  However, all these conceptual changes will happen, if at all, 
only after the teleological theory of representation has won general acceptance.  So 
for the time being advocates of this theory will do better to rest their case on the 
arguments for theoretical reduction. 
3.12  Empirical Evidence for the Teleological Theory
At this point it might occur to some readers to ask:  what exactly is the case for the 
theoreti cal reduction of representation to teleology?  Normally theoretical reductions 
are supported by empirical evidence.  When chemists established that water was H20, 
for example, they adduced a body of empirical evidence which showed that the exten 
sions of "water", as used by most people, and "H20", as used by the chemists, were in 
close agreement.  So, by analogy, the teleological theory of representation ought also 
to be supported by empirical evidence, in particular evidence which shows tha t the 
teleological theory's ascriptions of content coincide with those made by everyday 
psychology.  But where is this evidence?  What grounds have I offered for believing 
that the everyday desire for r will in fact turn out to have been selecte d to produce r, 
rather than s, or nothing at all, or the everyday belief that p will turn out to have been 
selected to be co-present with p, rather than q, or whatever?22
 In this respect the teleological theory of representation is worse of f than those other 
theories, discussed in 3.8 above, which agree that truth is the guarantee of desire 
satisfaction, but then explain desire satisfaction in terms of extinction of desires or 
reinforcement of behaviour.  For, whatever other difficulti es these theories may face, 
they can at least make a plausible case that they are part of everyday thinking about 
representation. 
 The teleological theory of representation, by contrast, needs to be defended as a 
theoretical reduction, not as a piece of conceptual analysis. So its defenders need to 
produce empirical evidence that its ascriptions of content coincide with those made by 
everyday psychology. 
 I think that they can meet this challenge.  But first, before ex plaining the solution, 
let me say a bit more about the problem. 
 Defenders of the teleological theory obviously need to recognize that everyday 
thought embodies a working notion of representational content, which is available 
prior to any analysis of representation which the teleological theory may offer.  After 
all, everyday thinkers who are quite ignorant of the teleological theory are able to 
ascribe beliefs, desires, and other contentful states to people, and by and large they are 
able to agree with each other in such ascriptions. 
 I take it that such ascriptions are informed by a body of folk psychological 
assumptions.  These will include such general principles as that people act in ways 
which their beliefs indicate will satisfy their desires;  that the truth conditions of belief 
are conditions which actually produce the satisfaction of desires;  that the satisfaction 
of desires will often, if not always, lead to their extinction, and to the reinfo rcement 
of the behaviour by which they were achieved;  and so on.  These general principles 
will be supplemented by some more piecemeal truisms, such as that people can 
normally see what is in front of them, that they normally mean what they say , that 
they can remember what happened yesterday, that they will desire what they 
previously desired in similar cicumstances, that they will be thirsty if they have had 
nothing to drink for days, and so on. 
 Together this body of everyday knowledge constitutes an implicit grasp of 
representational notions, a grasp that enables everyday thinkers to ascribe beliefs and 
desires with specific contents to people.  The teleological theory should be understood 
as offering a deepening and ref inement of this everyday understanding.  It deepens 
everyday understanding, as do all all theoretical reductions, by giving us fuller 
information about the nature of the reduced phenomenon, information which takes us 
beyond the surface features by wh ich the phenomenon is normally identified, to the 
underlying features which explain those manifest appearances.  And it refines 
everyday thinking by adding precision to our assumptions about representation and 
the propositional ascriptions they infor m. 
 Let me say a bit more about the way the teleological theory refines everyday 
thinking.  It is an implication of the aguments earlier in this chapter that the general 
assumptions of everyday psychology do not by themselves yield co mplete 
determinacy in ascriptions of propositional attitudes.  I pointed out in section 3.6 that 
the assumption that truth guarantees satisfaction places a joint constraint on 
ascriptions of truth and satisfaction conditions, but that, without some f urther account 
of desire satisfaction, this constraint can be satisfied by deviant permutations of 
normal ascriptions of truth and satisfaction conditions.  And I argued that the 
everyday idea that satisfaction extinguishes desires, or the idea that it reinforces the 
means which achieved them, are not adequate to fill this gap, since they fail to apply 
to desires in general.  In practice everyday thought no doubt fills much of this gap by 
appeal to such piecemeal rules as that people will desire what they previously desired, 
that they will be thirsty if they have had nothing to drink for days, and so on. But we 
can expect that, even so, there will be certain cases where everyday thinking is unable 
to decide about the content of certain desires, nor, therefore, of the beliefs which 
inform their pursuit. And in these cases the teleological theory of representation will 
be able to make determinate what everyday thinking does not. Imagine, for instance, a 
woman who has a recurring desire which leads her to visit a certain spot in a 
park.  She is not sure why she does this;  it could be for the flowers, or the restful 
atmosphere, or various other reasons.  There might be nothing in everyday 
psychology to determine the conte nt of her desire.  But there will still be a fact of the 
matter as to which previous effect of this desire has led its being preserved, and the 
teleological theory will fix on this on the content of the desire. 
 This would be a case w here the teleological theory fills a gap left by everyday 
thinking.  There is also the more extreme possibility that the teleological theory may 
actively overturn ascriptions of content made by everyday psychology.  The 
accidental replica discus sed in the last section is one example of this.  And we can 
imagine other, more mundane, cases in which everyday psychology's ascriptions of 
content do not tally with the selectional history of the relevant states, and so are 
deemed wrong by the tele ological theory.  However, to return to the main issue to be 
addressed in this section, cases like this had better be the exception rather than the 
rule.  For, before the teleological theory can start overturning everyday judgements, 
we need som e evidence that it is an acceptable theoretical reduction in the first place, 
and this requires, as pointed out earlier, reason to suppose that the teleological theory 
agrees, if not in every case, at least in most of the prior ascriptions of propositiona l 
content made by everday psychology. 
 The complaint made at the beginning of this section was that as yet we seem to have 
no evidence for such agreement.  Let me now face up to this challenge.  My strategy 
here will be to appeal to the argument of chapter 2 to provide the requisite 
evidence.  In that chapter I argued that it would be incredible that special-scientific 
properties should be variably realized, unless their instances are the product of some 
selection mechanism.  I think that this line of argument will serve to answer our 
present difficulty.  For it implies that it would be incredible that human beings should 
conform to the assumptions made by everyday psychology, unless their beliefs and 
desires had b een selected by processes which give them purposes corresponding to 
their contents. 
 Before going into details, it is probably worth clarifying the sense in which this 
argument provides empirical evidence for the coextensionality of the te leological 
theory's and everyday psychology's ascriptions of content.  This relates to the point,
originally made in section 2.2, that the "incredibility" of variably realized special-
scientific laws without a teleological underpinning is an empirica l matter:  the 
objection to such laws is not just that they offend brute intuition, but, more 
importantly, that they run counter to the wealth of experience which testifies to the 
general principle that uniform physical patterns have uniform physical explanations. 
 To see how these considerations help with the particular problem at hand, recall 
generalization (E): 
(E)  Actions based on true beliefs will satisfy the 
 desires they are aimed at. 
Now consider an instance involving a desire for some specific physical result, r, like 
getting hold of an ice-cream: 
(I)  Agents who act on true beliefs and the 
 desire fo r ice-cream will get some ice-cream. 
Note that (I) specifies a uniform physical state in the consequent.  Yet the antecedent 
conditions -- desiring ice-cream, and being a true-believer -- are presumably not 
themselves uniformly physically realize d.  So we might well ask, "Why do these all 
physically different antecedents have a uniform physical effect?" 
 This was just the kind of question we asked in chapter 2.  And the answer we gave 
there was that in such cases there w ill always be a selection mechanism which 
selected the physically disparate instances of the antecedent because they produce the 
common effect.  In fact chapter 2 has already applied this analysis to the specific issue 
of variably realized desires fo r ice-cream, and argued that the reason the different 
physical realizations of the desire for ice-cream all lead to the ingestion of ice cream 
is that this is why they were selected in the first place. 
 This observation now provides an ans wer to the question of why we should expect 
the teleological theory to agree with everyday psychology in ascriptions of content, at 
least in respect of desires.  The answer is simply that it would be a mystery that the 
desire for some physical result r should do what everyday psychology says it does, as 
in (I), unless it has been selected to produce r.23
The corresponding point about true belief is more interesting. Since generalization (I) 
generalizes across belief types, not requiring that the agent have any specific beliefs, 
but just that the agent's beliefs, whatever they are, be true, the "true belief" 
requirement in the antecedent will be variably realized by the truth of different belief 
types. Thus, being a true-believer can be realized by: believing that the shop is open 
and the shop being open; or believing that there is ice-cream in the shop and ice-
cream being in the shop; or believing that an ice-cream is within reach and an ice-
cream being within reach; and so on. In different cases, different external conditions 
are required for an agent to be a true-believer, and so for the agent's behaviour to lead 
to the desired result. And so now we have this version of the variable realizability 
puzzle: why do all the quite different conditions required for different beliefs to be 
true all lead, when conjoined with the possession of those beliefs, to the desired result? 
And the solution, once more, is that a mechanism has selected those conjunctions of 
condition and belief precisely because they produce such results. To be more accurate, 
we should think of the relevant mechanisms as selecting dispositions to form-certain-
beliefs-when24-certain-circumstances- obtain:  for instance, the disposition to form-
the-belief-that-an-ice-cream-is-within-reach-when-an-ice-cream-is-within-reach.  And 
the reason why different exercises of these disparate dispositions on different 
occasions will nevertheless all p roduce the same result, as required by (I), is that 
these dispositions will have been selected precisely because of the kind of effect the 
relevant beliefs have when their associated circumstances obtain.  It's the conjunction 
of beliefs and their tr uth conditions that ensures success, and so it's dispositions to 
form beliefs in conjunction with their truth conditions that is selected. 
 And this now show us how to answer the challenge of this section in connection 
with belief contents , analogously to the way we answered it for desires.  The 
teleological theory must match everyday psychology on ascriptions of belief contents 
because, as before, it would be a mystery that beliefs that p should do what everyday 
psychology says they do, as in (I), unless they had been selected to be present when 
condition p obtains. 
 Perhaps we could have reached this conclusion by a shorter, if less illuminating, 
route.  In the course of this chapter we have had occasion to note that our actions are 
directed by two kinds of mental states, beliefs and desires:  desires have ends attached, 
and vary over time in ways attuned to our needs, while beliefs tend to "track" specific 
external conditions;  and these beliefs and desires then combine to cause behaviour 
which causes those ends if those co nditions do obtain.  Now, this carefully 
orchestrated arrangement could scarcely have arisen by chance.  If this is really how 
our psychology works, then surely it must have been designed for that purpose --
not  by a conscious design er, of course, but by the blind selection mechanisms of 
learning and evolution.  (Cf Millikan, 1989a, pp 292-4.)  So once more we have prior 
reason to think that beliefs a nd desires must have been selected for purposes 
corresponding to their contents, as the teleological theory of representation claims. 
3.13  Verificationism Refuted
There is an important general moral to be drawn from the argument o f this chapter, a 
moral which will be central to the epistemological arguments in the third part of this 
book.  Namely, that the teleological theory is radically at variance with verificationist 
analyses of meaning which imply a conceptual tie betwee n the truth conditions of 
judgements and the conditions under which those judgements are asserted.  For there 
is nothing in the teleological theory of representation, when properly understood, to 
imply that there should be any definite correlation be tween the circumstances in 
which we are inclined to form beliefs, and those in which those beliefs are true.  The 
reason is that truth-conditional content, for the teleological theory, hinges on the 
results of beliefs, not their causes.  In part icular, the teleological theory identifies 
truth conditions as those circumstances in which the actions prompted by a belief 
cause the satisfaction of desires.  These are not the same circumstances as those which 
lead us to adopt the belief.  An d there is nothing in the teleological theory to imply 
any special link between these two sets of circumstances. 
 It is true, of course, that there will generally have been some biological pressure in 
favour of belief-forming processes whi ch tend to yield true beliefs, since true beliefs 
ensure the satisfaction of desires, and in general the satisfaction of desires is 
biologically advantageous.  But this link is easily disrupted.  Most obviously, there is 
the point that our natur al inclinations to form beliefs will have been fostered by a 
limited range of environments, with the result that, if we move to new environments, 
those inclinations may tend systematically to give us false beliefs.  To take a simple 
example, humans a re notoriously inefficent at judging sizes underwater. 
Rather more interesting are cases where our systematic tendencies to false belief are 
themselves the upshot of biological design, rather than simply the result of changed 
environments .  One illustration of this possibility is the belief about immunity to 
injury discussed in section 3.4.  In cases of this kind the normal biological pressure in 
favour of true beliefs is counterbalanced by a contrary biological pressure, which 
encourages us to form the belief about immunity even when it is false, so as to get us 
to fight and win.  And there are many other similar25 cases in which biological 
pressures produce systematic inclinations towards false beliefs.  These fa lse beliefs 
then lead us to act in ways that frustrate our desires, but tend to further our biological 
needs.  And in consequence the circumstances in which we form such beliefs will be 
systematically different from those which make them true, for tr uth conditions are 
tied to the satisfaction of desires, rather than biological needs. 
 Verificationists might feel inclined to respond that these observations are beside the 
point, on the grounds that verificationism only asserts a tie bet ween truth and 
normative assertion conditions, not actual ones.  What matters is when people ought 
to assert claims, not when they do.  So biological demonstrations that people often do 
assert false claims are beside the point.  (After all, verificationists can point out, a 
distinction between "canonical" assertion conditions and actual practice has always 
been implicit in verificationist thinking, for without some such distinction 
verificationism will fail to leave any room for false judge ments.) 
However, I don't think that an appeal to this kind of distinction can save 
verificationism from the biological facts.  For once we allow the kind of radical gap 
between truth and assertion that is implied by biology, then ver ificationists face the 
problem of providing some independent grounding for assertoric norms.  It is one 
thing to allow, say, that individual assertoric practice sometimes falls out of step with 
the majority line.  For then the majority will prov ide the norm for individual 
practice.  But if verificationism accepts that there can be judgements which nearly 
everybody gets wrong nearly all the time, then what basis is left for the thought that 
nevertheless there are agreed standards of correct judgement which are conceptually 
tied to the truth?26
Of course, there is one way of construing "assertoric norms" which will create a 
conceptual link between truth and normative conformity -- namely, we can equate 
such norms with whi chever judgemental procedures will lead us to the truth, and then 
giving some independent analysis of truth.  This is how I myself think of assertoric 
norms, with the independent analysis of truth being provided by the teleological 
theory of represen tation. 
 But this is not verificationism.  Verificationism aims to proceed in the opposite 
direction, by given some self-standing account of assertoric norms, and then defining 
truth in terms of the satisfaction of such norms.  T he normal basis for such a 
verificationist account of norms is the actual assertoric practice of the 
community.  My point is that this route ceases to be available once verificationism 
concedes to the teleological theory that the whole community can usually be wrong. 
1.  I am interested in representation as a problem for physicalism.  It is worth 
observing, however, that the problem is scarcely peculiar to physicalism.  Even 
dualists, for example, have an obligation to e xplain how their special mind-stuff can 
stand for other things.  Not that they have always recognized this problem, no doubt 
because their mind-stuff had so many special powers anyway --  such as the ability to 
exist outside space but in t ime, to be transparent to itself, and so on --  that one more 
special power scarcely seemed worth worrying about. 
2. Cf Fodor (1990, pp 63 ff). 
3. Versions of this teleological approach to mental representation are found in D 
ennett (1969, ch 9; 1987, ch 8), Fodor (1984), Millikan (1984, 1986, 1989a), Papineau 
(1984, 1986b, 1987), McGinn (1989, ch 2).  Fodor has since recanted.  He now holds 
(1990, Ch 3) that the teleological approach fails to solve the disjunction p roblem.  He 
says that there is nothing in teleology to tell us that a frog's fly detector, say, 
represents flies rather than flies-or-any-other-small-black-moving-objects, since a 
properly working detector will respond to any small black moving thing .  But Fodor 
is here assuming that the purpose of the fly detector is fixed by what causes it, rather 
than by what it is supposed to cause.  However, as I shall stress in what follows, 
biological purposes are always a matter of results.  In particular, the purposes of 
beliefs are to get the organism to behave in a way appropriate to certain 
circumstances.  This is why the frog's detector registers flies:  the frog's states cause 
the frog to behave in a way appropriate to flies, an d not just to any small black 
inedible dots.  (Why flies, rather than food, or survival, or gene perpetuation?  This is 
a different question, about a "vertical" indeterminacy which is orthogonal to the 
"horizontal" indeterminacy of the disjuncti on problem.  I shall answer it in footnote 
8.) 
4. This arguably oversimplifies the example somewhat (cf footnote 25 below).  But 
for the time being it will be helpful to sacrifice biological realism to explanatory 
convenience. 
5. While t his gives us one sense in which desire satisfaction is prior, there are other 
senses in which the representational powers of beliefs and desires are mutually 
dependent.  The sense in which desire satisfaction comes first is this:  the biological 
aim of desires is not (except in special cases) to produce true beliefs, but the 
biological aim of beliefs is standardly to satisy desires.  However, this is consistent 
with the point that desires always act in concert with beliefs when prompting ac tions, 
just as much as vice versa, and therefore that any desire fulfilling its biological 
purpose will depend on beliefs fulfilling their biological purposes too.  Moreover, 
because of this, we can expect desires and beliefs also to be psychodevelop mentally 
interdependent, each category becoming differentiated as a distinct psychological 
state only when the other is. 
6. Ruth Millikan (1984, 1989b) uses the phrase "proper function" for those effects of 
biological traits which they have been selec ted to produce (that is, for the aetiological 
notion of "function" or "purpose").  It is perhaps worth observing that in this sense 
both the "normal" and "special" purposes of beliefs are "proper functions". 
7. Dennett himself favours a selection ist account of representational content (1969, 
1987).  However, he seems not to have noticed the tension between this and his non-
realism about beliefs and desires. 
8. These points about our human structure of beliefs and desires now answers the 
question raised at the end of footnote 2, and explains why our different desires have 
different satisfaction conditions, rather than all being aimed alike at the ultimate 
evolutionary end of gene perpetuation.  For while it is true that the biologica l purpose 
of all desires is in the end to foster gene bequests, different desires have been 
designed to foster this end in determinately different ways.  This shows up in the fact 
that the desire for chocolate, say, doesn't disappear when you accept that eating more 
chocolate won't help you pass on your genes.  The appropriate way to think of the 
purpose peculiar to a given desire is as that result the desire will lead us to pursue 
whether or not we believe that result is a means to futher ends.  For further discussion 
of this point, see Papineau (1987, sect 4.3). 
9. Dennett's non-realism about belief-desire psychology makes him think that it is 
absurd to suppose that empirical discoveries might show that we don't have beliefs 
and desir es (1987, p 233-235).  I agree that this is absurd.  But this is not because I 
agree with Dennett that belief-desire psychology is non-theoretical and so somehow 
insulated from empirical evidence.  Rather, I think it is theoretical, but alr eady 
established by a wealth of evidence. 
10. I owe the argument for this principle to Horwich (1990). 
11. This response to the objection about uncertainty was suggested to me by Hugh 
Mellor. 
12. These examples were put to me by David Owens an d David Sanford respectively. 
13. Whyte (1990) aims to deal with this problem by arguing that the causal roles by 
which we ordinarily identify beliefs, and which then fix their success conditions, 
happen specifically to involve valid rather than inval id inferential moves.  I agree that 
common sense psychology regards the valid implications of beliefs as constitutive of 
those beliefs, by contrast with any characteristic tendencies to generate invalid 
conclusions.  But I think this is because ordinary thought identifies beliefs by their 
truth conditional contents, and then helps itself to the idea of those consequences 
which validly follow.  This means that any attempt to reduce truth conditional content 
cannot appeal to common sense psyc hology's view that  certain inferential 
consequences are constitutive of the identity of beliefs.  For these sets of constitutive 
consequences cannot be characterized without the notion of semantic validity. 
14. Why shouldn't we read the "if and only if" in an intensional way?  Well, if we read 
(G) as saying that ". . . the belief . . . will fulfil its biological purpose in all possible 
worlds where p", this will solve the snow is white/grass is green difficulty, but only at 
the cost of introducing possible worlds.  It is true that an explicit reference to possible 
worlds is only one possible way of analysing ". . . the belief . . . will necessarily fulfil 
its biological purpose if and only if p".  In chapter 6, however, I sha ll argue that, 
whether or not we adopt the possible worlds analysis of modality, modal judgements 
cannot be viewed as legitimate expressions of belief, and so are ineligible for essential 
roles in our best theories.  So I prefer to solve the snow is white/grass is green 
difficulty without using modal notions. 
15. Donald Davidson's approach to meaning (1984) can also be viewed as offering a 
kind of  analysis of truth-conditional claims like (H) (rephrased to apply to sentences 
rather than bel iefs), through not a reductive analysis, as above, but rather an implicit 
analysis, via an explanation of how to test an empirical "meaning-theory" which 
specifies (H)-claims for all a community's sentences. (For an exposition of this 
interpretation of Da vidson, see  Papineau, 1987, sections 2.4-8).  This Davidsonian 
approach to truth-conditional content has extra difficulties with the "snow is 
white/grass is green" problem, however.  For, while the problem can still be solved, 
given strong enough requirements about the need for "meaning-theories" to derive 
their (H)-claims from separate assumptions for sub-sentential components, it is 
unclear how to motivate these requirements within the Davidsonian 
programme.  From my perspective, th is is not a difficulty. I take a realistic view of 
belief components and their referential contributions to biological purposes. So I don't 
need any independent justification of the compositionality requirement, of the kind 
essayed by Davidsonian theorist s, such as that native speakers, or perhaps meaning 
theorists, need to derive their knowledge of an indefinite number of (H)-claims from a 
finite amount of sub-sentential information.  From my point of view such doubtful 
appeals to the preconditions for knowledge of meaning-theories are irrelevant, since I 
take the compositionality requirement to be a direct upshot of the semantic facts, 
irrespective of whether or not any native speakers, or meaning theorists, know a 
theory of those facts. 
16. Fo r the redundancy theory, see Ramsey (1927).  Deflationary theories are 
defended in Quine (1970), Leeds (1978), Horwich (1982, 1990);  for a general 
discussion, see Field (1986). 
17. From this perspective, the redundancy theory can also be vi ewed as consonant
with the idea that truth involves correspondence with the facts.  Those who adopt the 
redundancy approach to truth will not, of course, want to explain truth in terms of 
possible facts "obtaining".  But it seems natural to say, given the redundancy theory, 
that when the belief that snow is white is true, for instance, this is in virtue of the fact 
that snow is white.  This doesn't explain truth in terms of facts, but rather introduces 
facts as what make true beliefs true;& nbsp; still, when a belief is true, there will be a 
corresponding fact.  There remain questions about the "thickness" of any such 
fact;  are there any other reasons, apart from the truth of the corresponding judgement, 
for recognizing the fact, such as, say, its causal significance? 
18. Since this definition generalizes over Rs, the "adequacy condition" which provides 
an "external" test for the correctness of Tarski-style definitions of truth-in-particular-
Rs will become part of the definiti on of truth-in-general.  This is what we should
expect:  it reflects the point that you cannot have a general recipe for generating (H)-
claims without a substantial theory of what determines the contents of beliefs. 
19. At one time I thought that the we could equate truth for beliefs in general with the 
property of "generating actions which are guaranteed to succeed" (cf 1990, p 30).  But 
I now think that the "guaranteed" here conceals a reference to a reified truth condition, 
since wha t we need, for the truth of any token of a belief type, is not just some actual 
fact that will cause the action based on the belief to satisfy desires, but, more 
specifically, the obtaining of that possible fact which guarantees success for all 
actions ge nerated by tokens of the belief type.  An analogous point would apply if we 
tried to equate truth for beliefs with the property of "fulfilling their biological 
purposes of satisfying desires";  for such fulfilment needs to be understood in terms of 
the general condition required for the relevant belief type to fulfil its purpose, not just 
in terms of any accidental route to desire satisfaction. 
20. Cf Cummins (1989, ch 7); Whyte (1993).  The problem of the accidental replica is 
also dis cussed by Millikan (1984, p 94).  Note that the accidental replica wouldn't 
present a problem if we divorced the teleological theory of representation from the 
aetiological theory of teleology.  But since I see no virtue in non-aetiological acco 
unts of teleology, I shall not pursue this option further. 
21.This is perhaps a bit strong, given that some of the arguments for broad mental 
states do arguably have the corollary that your accidental replica will lack some of 
your mental states.  ; Thus, if the broadness of your concept of water depends upon 
which liquid was around when you learnt this concept, then a being that never learnt 
anything couldn't share your concept.  Still, many other broad attitudes don't depend 
on learning in t his way, and so there will be no pre-theoretical reason to deny them to 
your accidental replica.  And, apart from that, plenty of your beliefs and desires aren't 
broad at all, and so intuitions about broadness will do nothing to explain why your 
repl ica lacks these. 
22. I owe this objection to the teleological theory to a conversation with Andrew 
Woodfield. 
23. So far this only deal with desires for physical things.  But the story can be 
elaborated to accommodate desires for non-physical things, provided those non-
physical things in turn have physical effects, by reference to which the desires in 
question can then be selected.  A similar point applies to beliefs.  Beliefs can be 
selected to be co-present with non-physical condi tions, provided those conditions 
have physical effects by reference to which such co-presence can be selected.  The 
discussion of hierarchies of selection mechanisms in section 2.8 is relevant here. 
24. "When" only makes immediate sense for index ical beliefs.  For standing beliefs, 
we need the compositionality of beliefs to give it substance.  That is, we need to 
remember that beliefs are made of components, whose representational significance 
depends on their systematic contribution to the truth conditions of those beliefs, and 
that what gets selected, in the first instance, are therefore dispositions to deploy such 
components in just those cases when their contribution to the truth condition of the 
resulting belief will be satsified. 
25. In fact the earlier description of the immunity-from-injury case was something of 
an oversimplification.  The real biological problem in such cases is not that there is no 
psychological desire corresponding to the relevant biological need (to fight and 
triumph), but rather that this desire is insufficiently strong in comparison with other 
conflicting desires (like wanting to avoid injury).  Our biology then compensates by 
favouring beliefs that will get us to pursue such insufficiently st rong desires, even on 
scanty evidence.  (Perhaps the best-known of the many other examples of this 
structure is the human readiness to conclude that given foods are poisonous, thereby 
compensating for our biologically inappropriate tendency to let ou r hunger outweigh 
our fear of poisoning.) 
26. Followers of Michael Dummett might feel inclined to argue that there must be 
such standards, in order for people to be able to acquire or manifest their grasp of 
judgements.  (Cf Dummett, 1976, p 101. )  But the thesis that acquisition and 
manifestation depend on agreed standards of correct judgement is itself undermined 
by the observation that there are judgements which everybody tends to get wrong. 
